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Internet censorship index · Iran

Internet censorship in Iran: which platforms are blocked (August 2026)

Iran blocks 21 of the 25 platforms in our index in August 2026, confirmed on most networks measured — including the websites of all 8 VPN providers we could measure. OONI measurements taken inside Iran, re-pulled monthly.

Updated monthlyCurrent edition: August 2026 · previous: July 2026 · next update 5 October 2026

Measurement window
August 2026 (2026-08-01 to 2026-09-01, end exclusive)
Data source
OONI web connectivity measurements from inside Iran
Data pulled
2026-09-02. Re-pulled monthly; 2 editions so far.
Analysis
Sofía Giménez, Privacy, Jurisdiction & No-Logs Reviewer

Key facts, Iran, August 2026

  • 21 of 25 platforms are confirmed blocked on most Iranian networks measured, 1 more shows isolated confirmed blocks, and 2 (Wikipedia (EN), Google Search) are accessible.
  • The websites of all 8 VPN providers we could measure are confirmed blocked, at 81.7% to 87.1% of measurements (TotalVPN returned no measurements). The page you would use to buy or download a VPN is itself unreachable from most measured networks.
  • Blocking spans every category in the test list — social, messaging, news and video, circumvention tools and VPN provider sites. Iran is the one country in the index where the measured picture needs no hedging.
  • Nothing changed since July 2026. Every platform kept the status it had; the blocks confirmed then are still confirmed now.

Free to quote with attribution to vpnrank.io and to OONI as the data source. Please state the measurement window — a censorship figure without its window is not a fact.

Every platform we measure, and its status inside Iran

Each row is one platform tested from networks inside Iran during August 2026. “Confirmed rate” is the share of measurements in which OONI confirmed the block — a DNS answer pointing at a block page, a reset connection, a served block notice — divided by all measurements of that platform. Anomalies that OONI could not confirm are shown separately and never added to it.

PlatformCategoryStatus in IranConfirmed rateAnomaly rateMeasurements
TikTokSocial platformsBlocked — confirmed on most networks81.3%7.1%2,462
InstagramSocial platformsBlocked — confirmed on most networks75.1%15.7%4,841
FacebookSocial platformsBlocked — confirmed on most networks74.7%15.4%5,090
Twitter (twitter.com)Social platformsBlocked — confirmed on most networks71.1%19.3%4,510
X (x.com)Social platformsBlocked — confirmed on most networks68.2%19.7%2,453
RedditSocial platformsBlocked — confirmed on most networks63.2%21.3%2,277
SignalMessagingBlocked — confirmed on most networks69.8%19.3%2,045
DiscordMessagingBlocked — confirmed on most networks67.5%20.4%2,424
TelegramMessagingBlocked — confirmed on most networks56.6%36.6%2,138
NetflixNews and videoBlocked — confirmed on most networks87.0%8.5%177
YouTubeNews and videoBlocked — confirmed on most networks68.3%21.6%4,348
BBCNews and videoBlocked — confirmed on most networks63.0%25.7%746
The New York TimesNews and videoIsolated confirmed blocks1.1%1.4%368
Wikipedia (EN)Reference and searchAccessible0.0%1.4%139
Google SearchReference and searchAccessible0.0%0.0%163
Tor ProjectCircumvention toolsBlocked — confirmed on most networks84.4%9.7%186
Private Internet AccessVPN provider sitesBlocked — confirmed on most networks87.1%7.7%194
IPVanishVPN provider sitesBlocked — confirmed on most networks86.5%10.0%200
NordVPNVPN provider sitesBlocked — confirmed on most networks84.7%11.0%209
SurfsharkVPN provider sitesBlocked — confirmed on most networks83.6%10.4%220
CyberGhostVPN provider sitesBlocked — confirmed on most networks83.2%9.8%214
PureVPNVPN provider sitesBlocked — confirmed on most networks83.2%12.2%196
ExpressVPNVPN provider sitesBlocked — confirmed on most networks82.5%11.3%212
Proton VPNVPN provider sitesBlocked — confirmed on most networks81.7%14.3%224
TotalVPNVPN provider sitesNot measured
25 platforms measured inside Iran, August 2026. Confirmed-widespread means confirmed blocking in at least 20% of measurements; below 30 measurements a platform is reported as not measured, never as accessible. OONI data, pulled 2026-09-02.

The VPN providers’ own websites are blocked

The VPN-provider category is the reason we built the target list ourselves rather than reusing a standard one. These are the providers in our own database — the set we recommend from — and we measured their public websites the same way we measured everything else. In Iran, 8 of the 8 we could measure are confirmed blocked, at 81.7% to 87.1% of measurements. TotalVPN returned no measurements at all — OONI’s test lists do not appear to cover the domain, so it is reported as unmeasured and must not be read as unblocked.

Bar chart of the share of OONI measurements in which each VPN provider's own website was confirmed blocked: in Iran between 81.7% and 87.1% across eight providers, and in Russia between 15.3% and 20.0%
The websites of the providers we recommend, measured against the same test as every other platform. Iran against Russia for scale. vpnrank.io earns affiliate commission from some of the providers named.

The practical reading is narrow and worth stating precisely, because the tempting version is wrong. This does not show that a VPN fails to work in Iran; it shows that the pages you would use to obtain one are unreachable from most measured Iranian networks. The consequence is about sequence rather than capability — the moment to install and pay for a tool is before you are behind the border that blocks its shop.

Practical ruleA country that blocks circumvention websites has made the download, not the connection, the scarce step. Install and test before you land. Which VPNs we tested for Iran, and with which obfuscation protocol, is on the Iran VPN guide.

What changed since July 2026

No platform changed status between July 2026 and August 2026. Iran had 21 platforms confirmed blocked at national scale in July 2026 and 21 in August 2026. A month without movement is itself the finding: this is a settled regime, not a wave of new blocks.

What this measures, and what it does not

Reachability, not service. OONI’s web connectivity test checks whether a domain resolves and answers from inside the country. A platform that loads may still refuse to serve Iranian users; a blocked website says nothing about whether an already-installed app connects.

Confirmed and anomalous are different claims. A confirmed block has a signature — a block page, a poisoned DNS answer, a reset. An anomaly is a measurement that failed for a reason OONI could not attribute. The two are reported in separate columns above and are never summed, because merging them is the most common way a censorship figure becomes wrong.

Thin coverage is labelled, not hidden. Below 30 measurements a platform is reported as not measured. In Iran that applies to TotalVPN.

Method, thresholds and the country-by-platform matrix for all 181 countries are on the full internet censorship index. Data: OONI, OONI data is published under a Creative Commons licence — credit OONI by name with a link in anything published from this file.. Pull script and thresholds are versioned with the site.